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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case
The nature of this case on appeal seeks a review as to whether the District Court

erred in awarding Summary Judgment in favor of respondent/cross-appellant.
ii.

Course of Proceedings Before the Lower Court and its Disposition
On March 18, 2011, the plaintiff/appellant American West Enterprises, Inc.

(hereinafter '·American West") filed its Complaint in Minidoka County District Court.
The Complaint improperly named Case New Holland, Inc., as defendant. American West
alleged breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose and additionally demanded reimbursement for the cost of pa1is and labor.
On May 16, 2011, the defendant filed its Answer to Complaint and Demand.for

Jury Trial in the name of CNH America, LLC, (hereinafter "CNH"). CNH's defense
included the assertion that American West's claims were baned by a lack of privity
between the parties.
On May 4, 2012, CNH filed a Motion .for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Affidavit of William A. Fuhrman in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgrnent. (Tr. pg. II.) American West filed an
Objection to .Afotionfor Summary Judgment, Affidavit of Frank Jensen, Affidavit of Hal
Anderson, Affidavit o.f Chuck Simmons, and Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. (Tr.
pg. II.) Oral argument on the motion for summary judgment and motion for leave to
amend complaint was heard before the Honorable Jonathan Brody on June 11, 2012.
On July 13, 2012, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision Granting
D~fendant 's

Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaint~ff's Motion for Leave to

Amend Complaint. (Tr. pg. 70.) The 1'1emorandum Decision granted CNH's motion for
summary judgment and denied American West's motion to amend the complaint The
District Court found that privity of contract is required to recover for economic loss for
breach of an implied warranty and that there was no privity of contract between the two
parties. The District Court fUI1her found that American West was not a third paiiy
beneficiary to any contract between Pioneer Equipment and CNH and was therefore not
entitled to enforce any contract between Pioneer and CNH. Lastly, the District Court
found that Pioneer Equipment although an authorized dealer of CNH, was not an
of CNH. American West appeals each of these findings.
On July 18, 201

the District Court issued its Judgment dismissing American

West's claims. (Tr. pg. 80.)

iii.

Concise Statement of Facts
On June 26, 1997, American West purchased a Case IH 3394 tractor (hereinafter
from Can1eron Sales, Inc., which was CNH's authorized dealer and repair

center. Subsequent to the purchase, Cameron Sales, Inc. was bought out by Pioneer
Equipment Co., which remained CNH's authorized dealer and repair center.
In 2007, American West determined to sell the tractor but realized it needed a
new engine. Americai1 West therefore hired Pioneer Equipment to install a new engine in
the tractor. American West fUither requested that Pioneer Equipment order a new engine
from CNH to install in the tractor. The new engine was obtained and installed in the
tractor at a cost to American West of $11,955.04.
After the engine was replaced, American West decided to keep the tractor and did
so for two years. In that time, American West only used the tractor occasionally and put

approximately ten engine hours on the new engine. In the spring of 2009, the tractor was
sold to Frank Jensen. Mr. Jensen put approximately five engine hours on the tractor
before the engine blew up. Mr. Jensen returned the broken tractor to American \Vest,
which refunded him his purchase price and returned the tractor to Pioneer Equipment in
order to diagnose the engine problem. The new engine in the tractor only had
approximately fifteen hours on it at the time it blew up.
Pioneer Equipment tore down the engine to diagnose the problem and discovered
that the engine supplied by CNH had a faulty valve spring that broke and caused the
valve to drop down and contact the piston. This caused metal to be sent to the other
pistons and valves resulting in catastrophic damage to the engine. It was also discovered
by Pioneer Equipment that some of the valve springs in the new engine were used and out
of character with the new engine. Pioneer Equipment than contacted CNH field
representative Jeff Jensen and requested that the engine be warranted due to the faulty
engine valve spring, but was told that the engine would not be warranted. Further
attempts to obtain warranty service on the engine were unsuccessful and this action was
commenced March 21, 2011.

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT
GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FINDING THAT
PRIVITY OF CONTR.\.CT IS REQUIRED TO RECOVER
FOR ECONOMIC LOSS FOR BREACH OF AN IMPLIED
\VARRANTY.

A.

Idaho Cases/Law
CNH relied heavily upon the Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc., v. Cessna

Air Co., and the subsequent line of cases in their argument that privity of contract is
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required in an action to recover economic loss for breach of implied warranties. Salmon
Rivers 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975). The District Court, relying upon Nelson v.
Anderson Lumber Co., found in its Memorandum Decision that the Idaho Court of

Appeals has reaffirmed, as recently as 2004, that privity of contract is required to recover
economic loss for breach of implied warranties. Nelson 140 Idaho 702, 707 (Idaho Ct.
App. 2004 ). The District Co mi further wrote that while it was "sympathetic to the
possibility that the economic loss rule coupled with the privity requirement may result in
little or no recovery for American West, it is not this court's prerogative to ignore
precedent. Memorandum o.fDecision p.5. The District Court does not address the
holdings of State v. lvlitchell Const. Co. or Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin.
In

~Mitchell

Const. Co., this Court did not directly address the issue of privity in

relation the economic loss rule in its holding, rather Summary Judgment was affinned on
other principles. State v. Mitchell Const. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984).
However, in dictum three Justices voice their opinion that the previous holding in Salmon
Rivers was no longer valid.

Chief Justice Donaldson expressly did not concur with the majority opinion in
regards to Salmon Rivers. Id. at 337, 1351. Rather, Chief Justice Donaldson wrote that
he could not concur in the adoption or approval of the previous holding in Salmon Rivers.
Id. at 338, 1352. In reaching his decision, he relied upon an Alaskan Supreme Comi

case:
It is not the merchant who has defectively manufactured the
product. Nor is it usually the merchant who advertises the
product on such a large scale as to attract customers. We
have in our society literally scores of large, financially
responsible manufacturers who place their wares in the
stream of commerce not only with the realization, but with
4

the avowed purposes, that these goods will find their way
into
hands of the consumer. Only the consumer will
use
products; and only the consumer will be injured
by them should they prove defective.

Morrow v. 1\lew Moon Homes. Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976) citing Kassab v.
Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217,

A.2d 848, 853 ( 1968).

Justice Huntley, in his dissenting opinion, wrote that the "continued validity of

Salrnon Rivers is questionable-the requirement ... of privity in implied warranty for
economic loss did not make sense when the decision was written and its application has
resulted in substantial injustice to many litigants

Idaho since 1975. We should simply

overrule that case at this time." 1\1itchell Const. at
Upon rehearing the case after remand,

Justice Donaldson and Justice

Huntley continued to adhere to their previous opinions. Justice Bistline, however,
changed positions and wrote: "I now fully agree with the view earlier expressed by Chief
Justice Donaldson and Justice Huntley that Salmon Rivers should be overruled, and so
vote." Id. at 341, 1355. Justice Bistline continued: "Unless I misread Judge Schroeder's
opinion, he would not have granted the summary judgment if Salmon Rivers had not been
in place. If, as it appears, there are three votes to overrule that case, the summary
judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to the district coui1 for
reconsideration." Id.
The result of the Mitchell Const. case was there were three votes out of five to
overturn the privity requirements set out in Salmon Rivers. The requirement of privity in
cases that dealt solely with economic loss had been overturned; however
clear statement from this Court aiticulating this result.
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was no

The clear and concise statement regarding the continued validity of the Salmon
Rivers privity requirement came from Justice Bistline in his concuJTence in Tusch
Enterprises v. Coffin. Justice Bistline wrote: "Having concuned in the majority opinion,

I write only to infom1 the trial bench and bar that the Salmon Rivers v. Cessna Aircraft
Co. case, which is recognized as having continued by doubtful validity in the opinion for

the Court, was specifically oveJTuled in the State v. J\!fitchell case ... '' Tusch Ente1JJrises v.
Coffin, 113 ldaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987).

In the Tusch Ente1JJrises case, this court addressed but did not decide the issue of
privity in relation to the economic loss rule. Rather, the Court decided the issue of privity
in relation to subsequent purchasers of residential dwellings and the ability of subsequent
purchasers to rely upon the implied wananty of habitability. Id. at 103 5, 50.
Specifically, the court overturned any requirement of privity of contract between a
builder and subsequent purchasers of residential dwellings who suffer purely economic
losses from latent defects that manifest themselves within a reasonable amount of time.
Id. The Court expressed that any other holding would lead to an "absurd result." Id. at

1036, 51.
The Tusch Ente1JJrises court relied upon its previous decision in Clark v.
International Harvester Co., in reaching its decision. Id. at 1035, 50. In Clark, the court

held that a party suffering only economic losses could not recover under a negligence
theory. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). The
Tusch Ente1JJrises court explained this decision: "The rationale behind that decision was

to allow the law of contracts to resolve disputes concerning economic losses. If,
however, in the area of pure economic losses, negligence is to be preempted by contract
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principles, as we ruled in Clark, then contract principles must be given a freer hand to
deal with injuries the law has typically redressed." Tusch Ente1prises at 1035, 50. The
Tu.sch Enterprises comi continued: "Therefore, we decline to extend the privity
requirement enw1ciated in Salmon Rivers to the facts at hand. The instant case is not a

goods case, and the question regarding the continued vitality of Salmon Rivers in
such cases is better left to another day when a response on our part would be
something more than mere dictum." Id. (emphasis added).
In 1999, this Court again addressed the issue of privity of contract in cases of
economic loss in Ramerth v. Hart. Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 983 P .2d 848 (1999).
ln that case, the Court wrote that '·Salmon Rivers has been the subject of substantial
debate regarding the desirability of the rule that it announced as well as its continuing
validity." Id. at 198, 852. The Ramerth Court, however, read the Tusch Ente1prises
decision that the question regarding the continued vitality of Salmon Rivers in [cases of
economic loss] is better left to another day when a response would be something more
than dictum as continued affirmation of the Salmon Rivers rule. Id. The Court wrote:
"Despite Justice Bistline's opinion, however, the majority opinion in Tusch recognized
the continuing validity of Salmon Rivers ... We conclude, therefore, that Salmon Rivers
remains valid. We are not persuaded that the rule announced in Salmon Rivers should be
fmiher relaxed to allow a claim for breach of implied wan-anty on the facts of this case."
Id. (emphasis added).
The Salmon River string of cases has resulted in constm1ers being put in a difficult
position. The Clark case found that a party suffering only economic loss could not
recover under a negligence theory. This left contract theory as the sole means of redress
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for plaintiffs suffering only economic loss. Tusch E11te1prises relaxed the privity
requirement in a very narrow instance as it "would lead to an absurd result." Tusch
Enterprises at 1036, 51. Dictum in both Tusch Enterprises and ~Mitchell Const. indicate

that Salmon Rivers and its privity requirement have been oven-uled. The Ramerth Court
concluded that Salmon Rivers remains valid and shouldn't be relaxed on the facts that
were before the court.
Therefore, it appears that American West has no redress through negligence
theory given the holding of Clark. Furthermore, American West has no redress through
contract theory because of the holdings of Salmon Rivers and Ramerth which exclude
American West's claim due to a lack of contractual privity with the manufacturer of the
engine, CNH. However, this appears to be the set of facts, as this is a "goods case" for
which there is only economic loss, which the Tusch Enterprises Court had in mind in
order for the Court to respond with a concise decision that would be "more than mere
dictum." Tusch Ente1prises at 1035, 50.
B.

Other Jurisdictions

Some jurisdictions have now abolished privity requirements in wananty actions
where only economic losses were sought. In Nevada and Pennsylvania, the requirement
has been done away with as there is "no reason to distinguish between recovery for
personal and property injury, on the one hand, and economic loss on the other." Hiles
Co. v. Johnston Pump Co., 93 Nev. 73, 560 P.2d 154, 157 (1977); accord Salvador v.
Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 256 Pa.Super. 330, 389 A.2d 1148 (1978).

In Missouri, the Court adopted the view that abolishing privity "simply recognizes
that economic loss is potentially devastating to the buyer of an unmerchantable product
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and that it is unjust to preclude any recovery from the manufacturer for such loss because
of a lack of privity, when the slightest physical injury can give rise to strict liability under
the same circumstances." Grappe! Co. Inc., v. US G.nJsum

616 S.W.2d 49

(Mo.App.1981).
the privity requirement is not needed to assert a claim for breach of an

In

implied warranty against a remote manufacturer of a finished product. Hininger v. Case
C.mp.,

!"
..__1

F~ • .)""d 1

("th C~1·r. 1994).
J

In New York it was determined that a buyer from a dealer could sue the
manufacturer for direct economic loss for defective breaking system in a truck. Hubbard
v.

General 1'1otors C017J., 39

(S.D.N.Y. 1996).

The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Indiana summarized the purpose of
privity as follows:
Generally privity extends to the parties to the contract of
sale. It relates to the bargained for expectations of the buyer
and seller. Accordingly, when the cause of action arises out
of economic loss related to the loss of the bargain or profits
and consequential damages related thereto, the bargained
for expectations of buyer and seller are relevant and privity
between them is still required.
Implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
pai1icular use, as they relate to economic loss from the
bargain, cannot then ordinarily be sustained between the
buyer and a remote manufactmer.
Richards v. Goerg Boar and }vfotors, Inc., 179 Ind.App. 102, 384 N.E.2d 1084

(Ind.App.1977).
The Indiana Supreme Court expounded upon this privity requirement in Hyundai
}.Jotor America, Inc. v. Goodin. In that case, the Court pointed out that the rationale of

the privity requirement has "eroded to the point of invisibility as applied to many types of
9

consumer goods in today's economy." Hyundai A1otor America. Inc. v. Goodin, 822
N.E.2d 947, (2005). The Hyundai Court explained that the UCC recognizes an implied
warranty of merchantability if "goods'· are sold to "consumers'· by one who ordinarily
deals in this product. Id. at 958. The Hyundai Court further explained that doing away
with the privity requirement simply gives the consumer the contract they expected, while
the manufacturer is encouraged to build quality into its products. Id. at 989. The Court
continued: "To the extent there is a cost of adding unifonn or standard quality in all
products, the risk of a lemon is passed to all buyers in the form of pricing and not
randomly distributed among those unfortunate enough to have acquired one of the
lemons. Moreover, elimination of privity requirement gives consumers ... the value of
their expected bargain." Id.
C.

Absurd Result Under Existing Law
The privity requirement combined with the economic loss rule is draconian and

ill-equipped to deal with the realities of today's market place. A majority of products
purchased by consumers are not purchased directly from the manufacturer and the
consumer generally has no relationship with the manufacturer. Rather, products typically
reach the consuming public through inten11ediaries.
As it stands, if the conswning public suffers economic loss from a product they
purchased. they must commence an action against the intennediary or distributor they
purchased the product from who then must join the next intermediary or distributor until
every intennediary or distributor that has been involved in the transaction, no matter how
minimally, has been included in the chain of actions. Judicial efficiency and conf1ict
resolution are clearly not advanced by the privity requirement.
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In the case at hand, American West purchased, at great cost, a motor from an
authorized dealer of CNH. CNH did not provide a warranty on the motor, therefore
implied warranties attached to the engine. American West expected to have a new, good,
and workmanlike motor. However, the motor self-destructed due to a faulty valve spring
that appeared to not even be new. American West clearly did not receive the benefit of
their bargain. CNH however, has no reason to fear making faulty, inferior or defective
products because they rarely sell goods directly to the consuming public, and are
therefore insulated from liability because of the privity requirement. Rather, CNH sells
products through their authorized dealers.

It was not Pioneer Equipment, the authorized dealer, who defectively
manufactured the product. Nor was it Pioneer Equipment that was injured economically
by its defect. However, under the privity requirement Pioneer Equipment should have
been sued for the faulty motor. As the Court in the Tusch Ente1prises case found, this
would result in an "absurd result." Tusch Ente1prises at 1036, 51.

2. \VHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT
FOUND THAT AMERICAN WEST WAS NOT A THIRD
PARTY BENEFICIARY.
CNH argues that as there is no written contract between any of the parties in this
case, there is no ambiguity regarding the intent of the contract and the circumstances
surrounding any agreement between the parties intent may not be considered. Reply
Memorandum in Support of MSJ p. 3. The District Court however, believed that the facts

were sufficient to provide enough evidence to construe the contract between Pioneer
Equipment and CNH. A1emorandum Decision p. 6. The District Court found that there
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was no evidence that the contract between Pioneer Equipment and CNH reflected intent
to benefit American West. Id.
ln reaching its Decision, the District Comi found that although American West
argued that the engine was ordered specifically for the benefit and use of American West,
the fact that Pioneer Equipment charged $3,000 for labor shows that Pioneer Equipment
intended only to benefit itself. Id.
The District Court did not address the Affidavit (?f Hal Anderson or the Affidm1it of
Chuck Simmons in its Memorandum Decision.

In making its Decision, the District Court relied upon Idaho Power Co. v. Hulet,
which provides that the issue of whether a party is an intended beneficiary is one of
contract construction. Idaho Po·wer Co. v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110 (2004). In construing a
contract, a court should look to the "apparent purpose the parties are trying to
accomplish." Id. at 113. The District Comi wrote that as there is no written contract,
there is no document to construe to determine whether the contract itself reflects intent to
benefit American \Vest. Memorandum Decision p. 5-6. Therefore, under the District
Courts decision, there can never be an intended third paity beneficiary in the absence of a
written agreement.
Chuck Simmons is the service manager for Pioneer Equipment and as such
oversaw the ordering, installation, and diagnosis of the new

-"'•~"''-·

In his affidavit Mr.

Simmons explains that "the engine and core were ordered specifically for the benefit of
American West Enterprises, Inc .. and for use in their
Simmons

~

IH 3394." ,1/fidavit o.f Chuck

5. Mr. Simmons continued: "That due to cost, it is not customary to order new

engines and cores unless they are ordered for specific customers for use in specific
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equipment." Id.

at~

6. Hal Anderson expresses in his affidavit "I requested Pioneer

Equipment to order a new engine from CNH to install in American West's Case IH
3394." Affidavit (~f Hal Anderson~ 8. Therefore, we have both Mr. Simmons (CNH's
authorized dealer service manager) and Mr. Anderson expressing the "apparent purpose
the paiiies are trying to accomplish," which was to benefit American West with a
working engine in its tractor. Idaho Power Co. at 113.
The District Comi relied upon the Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co. case in
reaching that decision. In that case, the Court analogized the relationship between
property owners, the general contractor, and the subcontractors. Nelson v. Anderson
Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702 (2004). That case is no analogous to the case at hand.

American West did not hire a general contractor to do general construction work for
them. Rather, American West expressly requested the authorized dealer of a
manufacturer to special order ai1 engine for American Wests' use and benefit.
In Reed v. City o.f Chicago, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois found that since the benefit of paper gowns were for the protection of
potentially suicidal detainees, privity was not required as the detainees were the intended
beneficiaries of the paper gowns. Reed v. City of Chicago, 263 F.Supp.2d 1123 (N.D.
Illinois 2003). In that case, the mother of an inmate sued the manufacturer of paper
gowns that were used by the City of Chicago to clothe potentially suicidal inmates, after
her son committed suicide with a paper gown that did not tear away. Id. The Comi
wrote in its findings:
The beneficiary of any wan-anty made by the manufacturer
and designer of the gown is necessarily a potentially
suicidal detainee like Reed. If protection is not provided to
plaintiffs like Reed, any warranty as to the safety of the
13

gown would have little, if any, effect. In designing and
manufacturing the gown, the defendants contemplated that
the users of the gown would be detainees ... For these
reasons, a detainee of the City like Reed must be able to
enforce the protections of any warranties made by the
manufacturer and designer of the gown.
Id. at 1126.
Similar to the Reed case, CNH does not manufacture engines for the benefit of
their Authorized Dealers. If that were so, they would have gone out of business long ago
as the Authorized Dealers have no need for engines other than to install them in intended
third parties tractors. Rather, CNH manufactures engines for the benefit of tractor owners
such as American West.

It is clear from the Affidavit a_/ Chuck Simmons and the Alf/davit of Hal Anderson,
that American West was the intended beneficiary of the transaction.

3. \VHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT
FOUND THAT PIONEER EQUIPMENT WAS NOT AN
AGENT OF CNHAMERJCA.
The District Comi found in its Memorandum Decision that the question of
whether Pioneer Equipment was an agent of CNH was a question of fact as the facts
relied upon to establish the existence of an agency relationship were undisputed.
Afemorandum Decision p. 7. The District Court based this decision on the fact that there
was no dispute in the record that Pioneer Equipment was CNH's agent. Id. at 8.
In Adkinson C01p v. American Bldg Co., this Court found that proof of implied
agency is generally found in the acts and conduct of the parties, rather than from an oral
or written contract which establishes the agency relationship. Adkinson C01p. v.
American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341 (1984). The Adkinson Court fmiher
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found that the existence of an agency relationship is a question for the trier of fact to
resolve from the evidence. Id. at 409, 344.
In Adkinson, the plaintiffs brought suit against a manufacturer of metal buildings
for economic damages from the late delivery of a defective building. ABC was the
manufacturer of the building and RSI was its authorized dealer. The lawsuit was
originally brought against both ABC and RSI but RSI was dismissed from the suit after
filing bankruptcy. The District Court found that there was no principal-agency
relationship between ABC and RSI. Id. This Court, however, found that the evidence
was such that reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusion to be reached from the
evidence. The case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial on the merits. Id.
Among the evidence that was established in the Adkinson case was the fact that
RSI was an authorized dealer for ABC, that RSI participated with ABC in advertising
ABC buildings, that RSI was supplied with ABC brochures and order forms and
instructions, that RSI employees were given some training at an ABC plant, that ABC
representatives were frequently in contact with the RSI office, and that RSI ordered the
building in question from ABC. Id.
These facts are parallel to the facts of the case at band. Pioneer Equipment was
an authorized dealer of CNH and that Pioneer Equipment ordered the engine from CNH.
It is apparent that Pioneer Equipment receives training from CNH on installation and

maintenance of its products, that CNH and Pioneer Equipment jointly advertise CNH
products, and that CNH and Pioneer Equipment are in constant communication. It is
clear from the record that CNH acting through Jeff Jensen, told Pioneer Equipment that
the engine would not be warranted. Affidavit of Chuck Simmons~ 15-16.
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It is clear that at a minimum, Pioneer Equipment is CNH's implied or apparent

agent. The question of agency should have been allowed to proceed at trial where a full
body of evidence could have been established, much like it was in Adkinson.

JU.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

If American West is found to be the prevailing party on appeal, American West
requests that attorney fees be awarded for costs and fees reasonably incurred in the
appeal.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, American West respectively requests that this Court remand the case
back to the District Court finding that the granting of summary judgment was improper
for the above-mentioned reasons and that the matter be permitted to proceed to trial as
material issues of fact remain.
DATED this

day of December, 2012.
ROBINSON, ANTHON & TRIBE

~CY
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